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ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
OF GERMAN CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY MODEL: GUIDELINES 




Legal transplant, as a legal phenomenon, has always been present in legal history, and was especially brought 
to the fore in terms of creating major economic integrations, such as the European Union (EU). Membership 
of the Republic of Croatia in the EU has its strong legal basis because it belongs to the con-tinental law 
school initially based on the reception of Roman law, and later German law. The Croatian academic 
community believes that the harmonization of bankruptcy and legal regulations with the EU laws is not a 
goal in itself, but has a strong economic rationale. In this context, a number of ambiguities in the current 
bankruptcy legislation are indicated, one of them being the absence of lex specialis regulations for consumer 
bankruptcy. As the legislator showed an initiative for the reception of a model of consumer bankruptcy (the 
Foundation for the Introduction of Personal Bankruptcy, Ministry of Justice, Zagreb, 2012, pp. 1-6, and 
Draft Proposal of the Statement of the Regulatory Impact Assessment for the Preparation of the Draft of the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Law Proposal, Ministry of Justice, Zagreb, 2012, pp. 1-5 and finally Draft of the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Law Proposal, Ministry of Justice, Zagreb, June 2014) modeled on German legal 
solutions, the authors analyze the justification of such regulation in this paper.  





Bankruptcy legislation in the Republic of Croatia is 
directly related to the aspects of the existing socio-
economic relations. Since World War II onwards 
there have been several changes in the field of bank-
ruptcy legislation which were mainly an expression 
of market specificities and conditions (Bodul et al., 
2013). Until 1997, Compulsory Settlement, Bank-
ruptcy and Liquidation Act (Official Gazette (OG) 
 
 
53/91 and 44/96) was effective. Due to the necessity 
of a more contemporary regulation of bankruptcy, 
within the reform process, a new law, Bankruptcy 
Law (OG 44/96, 29/99, 129/00, 123/03, 82/06, 
116/10, 25/12 and 133/1 – further referred to as BL) 
was introduced. The starting point for the new BL 
was the German Insolvency Law from 1999 which 
itself radically changed German insolvency legis-
lation (Bodul, 2011).
1
 The aspects of the new law are 
such that the Croatian regulation concerning 
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this field is now largely in accordance with modern 
world solutions even though there are some com-
ments on this law as well. However, the present BL 
omitted the category of consumer as a possible sub-
ject of bankruptcy and the research problem arises as 
a consequence. The authors believe that the con-
sumer is unjustifiably omitted from the bankruptcy 
legislation, which can be corrected by adopting a lex 
specialis law that will regulate the field of con-sumer 
bankruptcy. Therefore, the purpose of the re-search 
is to analyze the justification of introducing 
regulations governing consumer bankruptcy in the 
Republic of Croatia modeled on the German legal 
solutions.  
In Croatia, there still isn’t a single textbook, mono-
graph or more significant work in the field of con-
sumer bankruptcy, as opposed to major work, re-
search papers as well as the judicial practice that 
exists in, for example, German law.  
There are only a few scientific texts dealing with 
this, still very “new” scientific discipline (see 
Garašić, 2011, Odobaša, 2011, Bejaković, 2010, 
Bodul, 2011 and Bodul, Smokvina, 2012).  
Therefore, the present research for the case of the 
Republic of Croatia will have a fundamental signifi-
cance, and will represent the first systematic and 
scientifically based analysis of a possible approach 
towards reform of subjective assumptions for the 
application of bankruptcy legislation and consum-
ers’ right to bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
 
2. The problem of choosing a suitable 
consumer bankruptcy model  
 
When drafting new legislation (in former socialist 
countries) the question whether the traditional con-
tinental European or the Anglo-American models, 
which are sometimes considered as more “modern”, 
should be adopted, appears almost regularly. Or 
perhaps, according to the slogan “the best of both 
worlds”, elements of both systems should be com-
bined. Namely, American and continental European 
legal models of consumer bankruptcy are based on 
different theoretical grounds, which necessarily 
causes the differences between these systems. Un-til 
the 1980s, European countries did not have a 
regulated consumer bankruptcy as a special form of 
bankruptcy proceedings. Economic conditions 
required its introduction to the legal system. In the 
 
EU Member States’ practice there are a number of 
different options in a situation where the consumer 
finds himself in a financial crisis and all those op-
tions are closely related and directly influenced by 
the “regular” bankruptcy law. Although all these 
countries have as a general and identical aim to 
modernize their law systems, they still have their 
own tradition, issues and conditions and therefore 
are facing individual challenges. However, an evi-
dent orientation of the Croatian legislation to the 
already existing German bankruptcy consumer 
model is coherent, because it enables the use of for-
eign judicial practice and literature as an aid in solv-
ing the issues that will arise in the application of the 
“new” law (Berkowitz et al., 2003). 
 
 
3. Legislative resolution of the German model 
of consumer bankruptcy proceedings  
 
The new Insolvency Code (Ger. Insolvenzordnung) 
entered into force in Germany in 1999.
2
 In accord-
ance with the rules of consumer insolvency pro-
ceedings,
3
 the consumer debtor’s aim is to be re-
lieved from remaining debts by liquidation of assets 
that can be seized and the proportional settlement of 
creditors. Special insolvency provisions provide 
consumers with the right to discharge debts in three 
stages.  
The first is determined in the consumer’s attempt to 
reach an out-of-court agreement on the debt regu-
lation with his creditors. An attempt, and not reach-
ing an out-of-court agreement on the debt regula-
tion, is a prerequisite for the initiation of insolvency 
proceedings.  
Within the framework of insolvency proceedings, a 
new attempt for reaching an out-of-court agree-ment 
on debt regulation follows.  
If within the second stage of the proceedings the 
creditors do not accept the plan for regulating the 
consumer’s debts, there follows the liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets that can be seized under judicial 
procedure. For this judicial procedure, simplified 
rules are applied and depending on the motion of the 
debtor, he can be relieved of the remaining debts 
over a period of six years (i.e. the period of good 
behavior).  
The indicated period of six years was introduced by 
the insolvency legislation reform in 2001, before 
which it had been considered that the period should 
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last for seven years. However, as the period of the 
so-called good behavior is essentially only one of the 
phases of consumer bankruptcy, preceded first-ly by 
an out-of -court and then a court reaching of an 
agreement on debt regulation, it has been demon-
strated in practice that debt relief should be waited 
for almost 11 years, and even more. Furthermore, in 
practice, the frequency of payments based on debt 
repayment plan has proved questionable, since in 
many cases the creditors do not realize economic 
benefits. A step forward was made by the speci-fied 
Amendments of Insolvency Code in 2001, ac-
cording to which the debtor is entitled to defer the 
payment of legal expenses, meaning that the debtor 
can settle them upon completion of the insolvency 
proceedings.  
Before the implementation of the stated amend-
ment, the rules of consumer bankruptcy demanded 
the rejection of the proposal to initiate consumer 
bankruptcy if bankruptcy estate was not sufficient to 
cover the expenses of the proceedings. However, in 
the case where consumers are able to defray the 
expenses, there is a significant problem in the in-
ability of the debtor to meet the creditors’ claims 
during the period of good behavior. Namely, the ba-
sic requirement is that during the six-year period, the 
debtor transfers as much as possible of his assets to 
the creditor. However, this goal is often unrealiz-
able. It has been shown (Lechner, 2011) that most of 
the consumers are unable to settle any part of the 
debt, so this leads to questioning the six-year period 
rationale, and also the fact that most consumers live 
“on the edge of existence” during the period of debt 
repayment should be bore in mind. It was an-
ticipated that the reform legislation in 2001 and the 
structure according to which the payment of the ex-
penses “transfers” to the completion of the debt re-
payment plan, would provide certainty of payment of 
expenses of the proceedings. Actually, the idea of 
the amendment is focused on adjusting the rules of 
bankruptcy proceedings to financial and social situ-
ation of insolvent consumers. Nevertheless, the re-
form not only hasn’t contributed to a more efficient 
and expeditious completion of the proceedings, but 
resulted in a larger number of submitted propos-als 
for bankruptcy. From the above stated, it can be 
concluded that the intention of the German legis-
lature to delay the payment of expenses of the pro-
ceedings, until the end of the debt repayment, has 
not provided satisfactory results. Moreover, it has 
been shown in practice that there have been more 
 
and more consumer bankruptcy proceedings. In re-
gard to this, it can be concluded that this system of 
designing the institution of consumer bankruptcy, 
imposes debtors to a very long period of debt repay-
ment, high and irreversible expenses of administra-
tion of the local government, and mainly it doesn’t 
help achieve the settlement of the creditors (Braun, 
2005; Kilborn, 2004). 
 
 
3.1. The necessity of reform of the 
consumer in-solvency proceedings and 
the remaining debt relief proceedings 
 
Every twelfth German household can’t meet its fi-
nancial liabilities due.
4
 The number of proposals to 
initiate the consumer insolvency proceedings from 1999 
to 2005 increased from 3,357 to 68,898.
5
 Be-hind the 
U.S. with the rate of 12.7%, Germany has the highest 
insolvency rate of 8.1% at the interna-tional level. Only 
6% of indebted households in Germany experienced 
benefits from the remaining debt relief.
6
 Due to the 
increasing number of over-indebted persons, debt 
consultants and Consumer Protection Offices have 
demanded amendments to consumer insolvency 
proceedings and the remain-ing debt relief proceedings 
which would enable a less complex debt relief for the 
insolvent custom-ers. At the center of criticism is the 
fact that these proceedings, in cases of insufficient 
bankruptcy es-tate, which amount to 80% of all cases 
according to the Federal Ministry of Justice, are too 
demanding and do not contribute to the settlement of 
credi-tors’ claims, which is the stated goal of insolvency 
proceedings. A model of the solution § 304ff. of the 
Insolvency Code has been marked as “having signif-
icant shortcomings”, which is a consequence of the fact 
that, unlike other elements of the reform of the 
Insolvency Code, it didn’t ensue as a result of several 
years of preliminary actions (Goldenberg, 2006). 
 
In a mandatory attempt to reach an out-of-court 
agreement, the “artificially inflated demand for in-
solvency advisory services” is criticized because of 
the unfeasibility in the cases of inability of “zero 
debt repayment plans”, disproportionate advisory 
efforts even in the cases of successful agreements 
and the unacceptability of the advisory model in 
practice (Goldenberg, 2006).  
In an attempt to reach a court agreement, the criti-
cism was related to the fact that such a model nei- 
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ther encourages creditors to reach any agreement nor 
offers contextual benefits compared with a plan of 
out-of-court debt regulation. In simplified insol-
vency proceedings, which generate the majority of 
expenses, the entire proceeding was criticized since 
in the cases with no bankruptcy estate, or due to the 
insufficiency of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate, there is 
no economic rationale. In the remaining debt relief 
proceedings, the remark primarily refers to the 
meaningless burdening and financial expenses of the 
judicial system, e.g. because of the inclusion of 
trustees, especially in cases with no bankruptcy 
estate.  
The criticism of the theory goes further and em-
phasizes that the disadvantages of the proceedings, 
besides the fact that even the debtors who have in-
sufficient means undergo a long and complex pro-
ceeding, and that the creditors have to participate in 
an attempt to regulate the debts without expecting 
some sort of economic benefits, also affect the jus-
tice system which is overloaded with a large number 
of proceedings with no bankruptcy estate. The big-
gest criticism is related to the fact that insolvency 
proceedings for consumers with no means gener-ate 
high costs and the consequence was that the reforms 
of consumer insolvency proceedings were primarily 
fiscally motivated. Insolvency proceed-ings with no 
assets have become financially unsus-tainable for 
budgets, primarily due to the deferred payment of 
expenses of the proceedings in accord-ance with § 4a 
ff. of the Insolvency Code. Therefore, the solutions 
are searched for in new approaches that would 
generate less cost. The burdening of budgets due to 
the delay of payment of expenses of the proceedings 
is certainly not a topic that should simply be ignored. 
It is questionable whether this issue should be in the 
forefront of reform efforts that should ensure the 
creation of new legislation for debt relief. The 
attention should also be paid to the fact that it is still 
arguable whether the budgets were as burdened as 
claimed. Hence the share of the cases of granted 
deferred payment of expenses, in which the 
repayment doesn’t follow for the biggest part, is 
according to some estimation 2/3, and ac-cording to 
other, an estimated 90%. The possibility of delaying 
payment of expenses of the proceedings exists only 
since 2001, and a significant increase of insolvency 
cases has been recorded only from 2003. In order to 
obtain data on the basis of which conclusions can be 
made, a time lapse of at least 10 years is required 
(the period of good behavior, and 
 
4 years of additional warranty period (Ger. Nach-
haftungszeitraum). Therefore, the theory holds that 
the first solid comprehension should be expected in 
the period from 2011 to 2014 (Lechner, 2011). Even 
if there would be speculation about the possible re-
turns of deferred payments of expenses related to 
cost recovery for 2005, which amount to 48.29 mil-
lion euros or for 2006, when the estimated amount is 
55.253 million euros, conclusions can’t be drawn, 
because there are no reliable data so far on the share 
of the proceedings in which the debtors were granted 
deferred payment of expenses, so it is not possible to 
compare the data on the return of the payments and 
the deferred payments (Goldenberg, 2006). 
 
Already in 2002, German judges and senior judicial 
officers called for the “re-establishment of the func-
tionality of insolvency courts and the Insolvency 
Code” and demanded a reform of the consumer in-
solvency proceedings and the remaining debt relief 
proceedings. Such a reform should enable a faster 
and more economical remaining debt relief pro-
ceeding. However, this reform was not necessary in 
order to spare the over indebted consumers of the 
complexity of the current proceedings, but to re-duce 
the workload of the judicial system, which has 
become overloaded due to an increase in proposals 
for initiating insolvency proceedings (Goldenberg, 
2006).  
In the mid-2003 the German Federal Ministry of 
Justice proposed the initial Draft of the Act on 
Amendments of the Insolvency Code, Civil Code 
and other laws.
7
 In the foreground was a proposal of 
merging attempts of reaching an out-of-court agree-
ment and court proceedings of debt regulation. The 
Draft Act on Amendments of the Insolvency Code, 
Credit System Law and other laws which were cre-
ated by officers, was published in September 2004. 
At the same time a discussion with certain discrep-
ancies from the original draft continued (Wiede-
mann, 2004). The Bavarian State Ministry of Justice 
proposed a withdrawal of the Draft and the estab-
lishment of a Bund-Länder Commission (working 
group at the level of federal country-federal states) 
that would examine legal procedural requirements 
and offer appropriate solutions for the cases with no 
bankruptcy estate, which is the biggest shortcoming 
of the existing regulations, in the opinion of the Min-
istry.
8
 In November 2004, Justice Ministers’ Confer-
ence
9
 established the Bund-Länder Commission, 
which consisted of representatives of the Federal 
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Ministry of Justice and State Ministries of Justice. In 
spring 2005, the Federal Ministry of Justice pre-pared a 
Draft proposal containing key issues, titled “Alternative 
forms of remaining debt relief - key is-sues of the 
possible reform”
10
. It focused on “the pro-ceedings of 
debt relief with no trustees” for debtors with no 
bankruptcy estate, which is also called the 
“Obsolescence Model” (Ger. Verjährungsmodell). 
According to this model, the consumer insolvency 
proceedings and the remaining debt relief proceed-ings 
in their present form would be implemented only for 
debtors with bankruptcy estate. The con-sumer 
insolvency proceedings would not be appli-cable to 
debtors with no means or with insufficient bankruptcy 
estate. A special debt relief proceeding would be 
applicable to debtors with no means or with insufficient 
bankruptcy estate. The main fea-tures of that 
proceedings are debt relief through obsolescence after 
the eight-year period expiration, the permissibility of 
enforcement measures that are otherwise prohibited in 
insolvency proceedings, absence of trustees and non-
obsolescence of claims that the debtor didn’t indicate 
(Hofmeister, Jäger, 2005). In June 2005, at the 
Conference of Ministers of Justice, the Bund-Länder 
Commission proposed an interim report “New Paths 
towards the remain-ing debt relief”.
11
 The commission 
advocates for the idea of “rectified (relocated) 
proceedings” (Ger. ausgelagertes Verfahren) for 
debtors with no bank-ruptcy estate (Springeneer, 2006). 
In March 2006, the Federal Ministry of Justice 
forwarded a proposal for discussion to the members of 
the Bund-Länder Commission, titled “Draft of the Act 
on debt relief for persons with no means and on 
amendments to insolvency proceedings for consumers” 
(Ger.  
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Entschuldung völlig 
mittelloser Personen und zur Änderung des Ver-
braucherinsolvenzverfahrens).
12
 The proposal was 
supposed to be the basis for discussion within the 
commission, but despite its name, it still didn’t rep-
resent a Draft of the Act of the Federal Government. 
The conclusions of the discussion at the Conference of 
Ministers of Justice were presented in 2006, and were 
the basis for the Draft of the Act prepared by the 
Federal Ministry of Justice (Goldenberg, 2006).
13 
 
3.2. Debt relief structure for the most 
vulner-able consumers through a Draft 
of Act on debt relief for persons with no 
means and on amendments to 
insolvency proceedings for consumers 
 
In the Draft of the Act on debt relief for persons with 
no means and on amendments to insolvency 
proceedings for consumers (hereinafter: the Draft) 
proposed by the Federal Ministry of Justice, the cen-
tral focus is on a special debt relief proceeding for 
debtors with no means and on amendments to in-
solvency proceedings for consumers with the relief 





3.2.1. The debt relief proceedings for 
consumers with no means 
 
The theory advocates the position that a special debt 
relief proceeding should be available to all con-
sumers with no means. The proceedings would be 
initiated by a specific person or a department re-
sponsible for issuing certificates of inability to reach 
an agreement with creditors and for the preparation 
of forms for submission of proposals. After deter-
mining the insufficiency of bankruptcy estate, the 
insolvency court should inform the creditors which 
the debtor had indicated in the list of creditors and 
claims about the proceedings, and invite creditors to 
submit a proposal for rejection and state the rea-sons 
for rejection within one month period. If the court 
does not receive the request for rejection, it 
determines by a decision that the debtor would be 
relieved from debts no later than eight years after the 
decision, unless the proposal is rejected during that 
period. There is no need to register or deter-mine 
claims
15
 or appoint trustees. In accordance with §4a-
4d of the InsO, the institute of deferred payment of 
the proceeding expenses should not be applied, 
because no costs incur for the debtor in the debt 
relief proceedings. During the eight-year period, the 
creditor can generally initiate the enforcement 
procedure, but the enforcement may be limited under 
certain circumstances. The Draft contains several 
options for limiting the enforce-ment, but they 
haven’t been completely defined and are subject to 
further discussions of the Bund-Länder Commission. 
After the expiration of the debt relief period, the 
debtor would be exempt from 
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creditor’s claims which the creditor indicated, but 
the relief would have no effect on the remaining 
claims (Goldenberg, 2006). 
 
 
3.2.2. Insolvency proceedings for consumers 
and the remaining debt relief proceedings 
 
According to the Draft, the insolvency proceedings 
for consumers and the proceedings for remaining 
debt relief should be available to all individuals who 
at the time of the proposal submission do not carry 
out entrepreneurial activities, and who can cover the 
expenses of the proceedings. The theory sug-gests a 
sort of merging of attempts aimed at reach-ing an 
out-of-court or a court agreement in order to 
maximize the prospects for concluding an agree-
ment, as well as to remove the differences between 
regular and simplified insolvency proceedings and 
the breakdown of the duration of the good behav-ior 
period. If the debtor reimburses at least 20% of the 
creditors’ claims, then his period of good be-havior 
reduces to four years, and in the case of re-
imbursement of at least 40%, the period reduces to 
two years. In other cases, the good behavior period 
would last as usual, for six years. The Draft further 
on implies an expansion of the list of reasons for re-
jection from §290 of the Insolvency Code, and the 
rejection by virtue of the office when there are obvi-
ous reasons for it. Moreover, a catalog of excluded 
claims is also implied.
16
 It is important to emphasize 
that the maintenance liability that a debtor has, but 
deliberately does not meet it, would not be covered 
by the remaining debt relief (Goldenberg, 2006).  
The Draft implies that the insolvency proceedings 
for consumers and the proceedings for the remain-
ing debt relief, unlike complete debt relief, should 
last less in order to motivate the debtor to pay the 
proceeding expenses. Thus, the Federal Ministry of 
Justice as the author of the Draft “in the interest of 
the over-indebted and in order to protect the re-
sources of the judicial system” (Ger. im Interesse der 
Überschuldeten und um die Ressourcen der Justiz zu 
schonen), has set the goal of finding less complex 
ways of debt relief and amendments to consumer 
insolvency proceedings so that the proceedings 
would be as flexible and efficient as they can be and 
to demand less effort.
17 
 
3.2.3. The main criticism of the planned 
amend-ments 
 
For the most part, the Draft anticipates a regula-tion 
which coincides with the current proposal of the 
Bund-Länder Commission. Important discrep-ancies 
are evident in the possibilities of limiting 
enforcement measures during the debt relief pro-
ceedings, where the enforcement procedure would 
still be permitted. The permission of the enforce-
ment procedure is the central point of criticism of the 
model of Bund-Länder Commission. Thus, it 
remains to be determined which restriction possi-
bilities from the Draft will enter the new Act. If the 
restrictions are not carried over, the permission of 
the enforcement procedure will again become the 
center of criticism. Considerations arising from the 
scientific community, the legal profession and debt 
consultants indicate the misgiving that despite the 
fact that the debtors have no assets, it will result in a 
“flood” of enforcement procedures on accounts, with 
account closings as the final result. The re-quests for 
protection, which debtors may submit ac-cording to 
§ 850 k of ZPO,
18
 will lead to an increased burden of 
courts for enforcement and credit institu-tions to 
which enforcement procedure represents a 
considerable expense. This way the debtor’s efforts 
in finding a new job are endangered, along with his 
economic reintegration, because employers, as the 
debtor’s debtors, are often reluctant to burden 
themselves with enforcement procedures on sala-ries 
(Goldenberg, 2006).  
The following criticism of the theory applies to a 
limited impact of debt relief only for the creditors’ 
claims indicated by the debtor himself. The aim of a 
serious debt relief cannot be a solution for only a 
part of debts, but a sustainable relief from all debts 
and the debtor’s re-inclusion in the regular eco-
nomic and working life. That is achievable only by 
regulating the limited impact of debt relief, since 
often all the creditors cannot be specified and also 
frequently several years pass since the principal debt 
was incurred and before the advisory service is 
contacted. Also, it happens that even though there is 
a record of a creditor, his title or the amount of the 
claim aren’t known or he does not respond to 
invitations. Further on, it is difficult to find justifica-
tion for the fact that the creditors that the debtor 
indicated, have to accept his debt relief, while oth-
ers may still persist in their demands (Goldenberg, 
2006). 
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The limited effect of debt relief in the Draft is justi-
fied with the fact that on one hand, the debtor is 
encouraged to be more active, and on the other, the 
limitation of enforcement measures for all the cred-
itors requires that they are at least informed about 
the proceedings, which would imply a consider-ably 
more arduous and expensive proceeding. This should 
be avoided, so that the debt relief proceed-ings 
would be shorter (Goldenberg, 2006).  
Further criticism of the theory was related to the 
eight-year duration of the debt relief proceedings 
that in the Draft, among other things, is explained by 
the fact that this should motivate the debtor to pay 
the proceeding expenses, in order that he passes to 
the good behavior period within the remaining debt 
relief. However, the experience shows that the six-
year period is difficult as it is for the consumers, so 
the extension of this period cannot be justified. A 
dilemma has also arisen about achieving an ob-
jective of the Draft related to the financial relief of 
the budget. In this context, the estimation regard-ing 
budget relief for the justice system, meaning the 
transfer of expenses to budgets of other depart-ments 
and institutions, is “too optimistic”. Certainly the 
repeal of deferred payments of the proceeding 
expenses would partially reduce the burden on jus-
tice budgets. However, since the amendments to the 
debt relief proceedings do not imply the payment of 
fees, even if the insolvency court was involved in the 
proceedings to a certain extent, the proceeding 
expenses would be charged to the justice budget (e.g. 
costs of checking the general assumptions of the 
admissibility of the opening of the proceed-ings, 
examining requests for rejection, debt relief denial 
ex officio, decisions on requests for debt re-lief or 
revocation of a decision on debt relief). In addition, 
expenses associated with permitted en-forcement 
procedures during the debt relief would incur, due to 
the fact that the debtors with no as-sets would file 
objections to enforcement in order to protect 
themselves from the growing number of creditors’ 
requests for enforcement procedures. The debt relief 
proceedings could create additional expenses for the 
budgets of other departments and institutions. Thus, 
the permissibility of enforcement would lead to the 
fact that mediation in the employ-ment of 
unemployed debtors wouldn’t be successful in most 
cases, because the employer has to take into account 
that an enforcement procedure on salaries may be 
initiated during the period of eight years, though 
only by the creditors that the debtor had not 
 
previously specified, as the Draft includes an option 
for limiting enforcement (Goldenberg, 2006).  
Moreover, the compliance of the proposed amend-
ments to consumer insolvency proceedings and re-
maining debt relief proceedings with the principle of 
equal treatment is ambiguous. Namely, regula-tions 
with different actions against the debtor who has 
certain bankruptcy estate and against a debtor with 
no bankruptcy estate, by putting such a debtor in a 
worse position, would lead to a „legal right of two 
classes“ and „exclusion“ of debtors with lowest 
incomes, meaning those who do not have any in-
come. Such legislative regulation would significant-
ly violate the principle of equal treatment which is 
not in accordance with §3, sub-section 1 of the Con-
stitution (Goldenberg, 2006). 
 
3.3. Alternative structures 
 
Theoretical discussions about the necessity of 
amendments on insolvency proceedings for con-
sumers and the proceedings for remaining debt relief 
have led to the fact that in recent years, dif-ferent 
individuals and groups of people have de-veloped 
various structures for reshaping the pro-ceedings. It 
is still not clear whether and to which extent these 
proposals will affect the final Draft of the Act. 
Therefore, it is necessary to introduce vari-ous 
models and their main determinants in order to gain 
a better insight into the overall issues and that the 
present Draft could be assessed from different 
perspectives (Goldenberg, 2006). 
 
3.3.1. “The Wustrau Regulation” 
 
At the beginning of 2005, as a result of the criticism 
of the dualistic regulation depending on whether the 
debtor has any assets (bankruptcy estate), the 
German Ministry of Justice invited representatives of 
the State Ministries of Justice, Federal Ministry of 
the Family, associations of creditors, lawyers and in-
solvency administrators, insolvency administrators, 
debt consultants, insolvency courts and the scien-
tific community to the Judicial Academy in Wus-
trau in order to develop a new concept. „Two ways 
towards the same goal – the legal remaining debt 
relief” were developed in the context of the Wus-trau 
model (Goldenberg, 2006). The model includes a 
combination of former insolvency proceedings 
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for consumers as debtors with bankruptcy estate and 
the insolvency proceedings in the cases with no 
bankruptcy estate. Those proceedings would not be 
independent from each other, but there would be a 
single proceeding that would be flexible and would 
last shorter. The proceedings of debt relief should be 
preceded by an attempt to reach an out-of -court 
agreement. If that doesn’t happen, or if, due to the 
insufficiency of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, a 
testimonial is provided about the inability to reach 
that agreement, the debtor can apply for the start of 
the consumer insolvency proceedings, meaning the 
proceedings for debt relief, justification of which has 
to be determined by the court. The possibility of a 
debt regulating plan within the legal proceedings still 
remains in force (Goldenberg, 2006).  
The consumer insolvency proceedings should be 
applied when the debtor can cover the expenses of 
the proceedings and can settle at least 10% of the 
creditors’ claims, whereby the lowest percentage of 
the settlement of the claims hasn’t been determined 
by a consensus. If the court finds that the consum-ers 
insolvency proceedings cannot be initiated be-cause 
of the insufficiency of bankruptcy estate, the debt 
relief proceedings would be initiated. This can be 
equalized with a direct transition to the good 
behavior period. This way, the insolvency proceed-
ings is bypassed. The publication of the decision to 
initiate the proceedings would exclusively follow via 
the Internet. The creditors are informed about the 
proceedings and are asked to verify whether their 
claims were taken into account and to state the 
reasons for rejection. Already at this stage, the court 
should decide on the request for rejection. The 
initiation of the proceedings should lead to the 
suspension of enforcement that would be extended to 
all six years of the debt relief proceedings. A trus-tee 
would be appointed in the proceedings, whose only 
role would be account management, i.e. the disposal 
of bankruptcy estate and its distribution to the 
creditors. At the end of the debt relief pro-ceedings, 
the debtor is relieved from the remaining debts, and 
this applies to all claims. According to this model, 
the consumer insolvency proceedings would be 
implemented the same way as it is carried out at the 
moment. The only difference is the articu-lated 
duration of the good behavior period: in the cases of 
a 10% settlement, it would last for five years, and in 
the cases of a 25% settlement it would last for four 
years. Thus, according to the legal theory, the most 
important differences between this model 
 
and the current Draft are: that the debtors with no 
bankruptcy estate would be relieved from all the re-
maining debts and claims after six years according to 
the Wustrau model; that the enforcement is not 
allowed; and that the court should be involved in the 
proceedings to the point of the decision on the 
remaining debt relief (Goldenberg, 2006). 
 
3.3.2. “The trustee structure” 
 
German Bar Association (Ger. Deutscher Anwalt-
verein) has developed the so-called model with a 
trustee, based on considerations of Grote. In the 
foreground of this model is the exclusion of “unnec-
essary” proceedings from the Insolvency Code. The 
doctrine states that it implies the opening of a special 
proceeding for debtors with no bankruptcy estate, 
with the main goal being the remaining debt relief. 
There would be no need to open the insolvency pro-
ceedings, but the debtor has to be immediately re-
directed to the period of good behavior. Therefore, 
according to the theory, the regulation §286ff. of the 
Insolvency Code about the good behavior period 
should be complemented in order to compensate the 
missing rules on the insolvency proceedings. The 
application and the determination of creditors’ 
claims should be simplified, whereby the enforce-
ment procedure of determining the claims would be 
retained. The claims should be determined based on 
the information that debtors state in their lists, and 
they would not be further investigated. In the cases 
where the distribution can’t be expected, the model 
gives the court the ability to omit the proce-dure of 
determination of claims based on their as-sessment. 
According to the authors of this model, it is 
necessary to not only retain, but also to give more 
importance to the attempt of reaching an out-of-court 
agreement and the debt regulating proceed-ings. A 
trustee would be appointed the same way as it is 
appointed at the moment, and the prohibition of 
enforcement procedure would still be retained in the 
cases with no means. If the debtor can cover the 
expenses of the proceedings, the insolvency pro-
ceedings would be opened, the distribution would be 
dropped in the regular proceedings and the con-
sumer insolvency proceedings which would lead to 
omission of § 311ff. and § 304ff. of the Insolvency 
Code (Goldenberg, 2006).  
The model contains several suggestions for reduc-
ing the burden of state budgets without the rever-sal 
of the deferred payment of expenses. In order 
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to achieve this, debtors with insufficient bankruptcy 
estate should cover the trustee’s compensation ex-
penses. Until the expiration of the good behavior 
period, the relief of the remaining debts could be 
made dependent on proceedings cost recovery, 
which were deferred, or the debtors, excluding the 
recipients of unemployment benefits (ALG II) and 
social welfare, could be committed to repaying the 
deferred expenses in monthly installments during the 
good behavior period. The theory holds that this 
model emphasizes a flexible response of insol-vency 
courts in order to ensure effective and fair solutions 
for different cases, and on the other hand to reduce 





3.3.3. The structure according to the 
“Simplified remaining debt proceedings” 
 
A working group started developing this model in 
August 2005. It was formed of representatives of 
State Ministries of Social Welfare, the Federal Asso-
ciation for Debt Counseling (Ger. Bundesarbeitsge-
meinschaft Schuldnerberatung – BAG-SB), Fed-
eration of German Consumer Organisations (Ger.  
Verbraucherzentrale des Bundesverbandes) and the 
Federal Ministry of Family Affairs. The aim of this 
model is to find a way to provide the economic and 
social reintegration to debtors with no assets, taking 
into account the expenses. The model anticipates two 
different ways for the remaining debt relief. The 
debtors with bankruptcy estate, which can cover the 
proceeding expenses and settle the creditors in the 
5% amount of claims after the good behavior period, 
would still enter the consumer insolvency proceed-
ings in the current form, however, with the good 
behavior period of five years. Debtors with no bank-
ruptcy estate would have at their disposal a “simpli-
fied remaining debt relief proceeding”. The proceed-
ing may or may not be preceded by an attempt to 
reach an out-of-court agreement. After the debtor’s 
request for the opening of the proceeding, the court 
determines whether the debtor has a certain bank-
ruptcy estate, otherwise already in this phase the 
scope of the claims and the debtor’s honesty should 
be verified. The claims are registered electroni-cally, 
thus the matrix assembly is avoided. If there weren’t 
rejections of remaining debt relief due to the debtor’s 
dishonesty, there follows a court decision 
 
on rejection of the request for opening the proceed-
ings because of the insufficiency of bankruptcy es-
tate and the remaining debt relief is announced and 
the good behavior period is initiated. During this 
period, the debtor has to fulfill the obligations that 
correspond to obligations that are currently valid in 
the remaining debt relief proceedings. At the same 
time, the enforcement procedure would not be per-
mitted and the trustees would be excluded. Instead, a 
court bailiff, who would collect sizable amounts and 
divide them to the creditors, would be ap-pointed. In 
order to limit the proceedings expenses, debtors who 
have incomes higher than the unem-ployment 
benefits (ALG II) should participate in the costs of 
publication in the amount of 100 euros. At the end of 
the good behavior period, the write-off of the 
remaining debt starts, including the claims of all 
creditors. This model is not considered particularly 
innovative because it encompasses elements from 
the “Wustrau model”, the “Heyer’s model” and the 
Draft of the officers from the Federal Ministry of 
Justice from September 2004, with certain amend-




3.3.4. Structures from judicial circles – 
“The Heyer Structure” 
 
The origin of the model proposed by Heyer is re-
lated to the retention of “trusted” elements of the 
consumer insolvency proceedings currently in force 
and the remaining debt relief proceedings, to which, 
along with the period of good behavior, the out-of-
court proceeding in his opinion belongs. Simplify-
ing of the existing proceedings could be achieved 
e.g. by merging of attempts to reach an out-of-court 
agreement with the proceedings of court regula-tion 
of debts or in the case of a complete inability to 
reach an agreement after proper verification by a 
responsible authority, by stopping the attempts to 
reach the out-of-court agreement. After a success-ful 
insolvency request and a judicial review of the 
debtor’s property relations, the insolvency proceed-
ings should be opened when the debtor can cover the 
proceeding expenses and settle his creditors in more 
than 10% of the amount of claims. If the 
prerequisites for the opening of the proceeding are 
not fulfilled, due to the insufficiency of bankruptcy 
estate the insolvency request is denied and after the 
verification of the debtor’s integrity, the debtor 
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directly enters the good behavior period. Before that, 
the creditors should be informed about the in-tended 
rejection by an appropriate decision with an 
invitation for stating the reasons for the rejection in 
accordance with §290 of the InsO. In the absence of 
the denial due to the violation of duties before 
rejecting the insolvency request and during the good 
behavior period, the debtor’s remaining debts are 
written off after the good behavior period. The 
model includes the retaining of the enforcement 
prohibition in case of implementation of insolven-cy 
proceedings and the rejection of the insolvency 
request due to the insufficiency of bankruptcy es-
tate. The registration and verification of the claims 
should be abolished in order to avoid a demand-ing 
proceeding which loses its rationale at the lat-est 
during the remaining debt relief according to §301 of 
the InsO, and which entails the conversion of claims 
into the so-called incomplete obligations. Instead, 
income and assets, if any, should be distrib-uted on 
the basis of a divisional list. This would re-sult in the 
limited involvement of trustees, and thus less 
expense would incur. With his model, according to 
the doctrine, Heyer, on one hand, tends to unbur-den 
state budgets, and on the other hand, tends to set free 
debtors with no assets of their obligations on the way 




3.3.5. Proposals of an ad hoc lawyer 
working group 
 
At a forum of practitioners of ZAP publishing house 
(ZAP-Verlag) in Hanover, a working group was es-
tablished in order to develop proposals for amend-
ments and revision of the existing regulations of 
consumer insolvency law with the remaining debt 
relief. They developed various proposals for amend-
ments on certain parts of consumer insolvency pro-
ceedings and the remaining debt relief proceedings, 
such as complete omission of the good behavior pe-
riod. That way the debtor, if there are no grounds for 
the rejection, would be immediately relieved of the 
remaining debt after the completed insolvency pro-
ceedings and liquidation of assets. Another sugges-
tion is an “optional period of good behavior”, i.e. for 
a debtor with no assets, the good behavior period 
would be introduced only at the request of a credi-tor 
who would in that case have to bear the expens-es of 
minimum fees for the trustee. If the creditor 
 
does not file a claim, then the debtor is immediately 
relieved from the remaining debts, which is sub-ject 
to some restrictions. In addition to individual 
proposals, a model was drafted according to which 
the debtor with no assets undergoes a proceeding 
consisting of two phases - the opening of the pro-
ceedings and the good behavior period. As a further 
amendment, the model considers the registration of 
claims only when a certain part of the settlement can 
really be expected compared with the current 
regulations. Further on, it considers a substitution of 
the annual distribution to creditors by a onetime 
distribution at the end of the good behavior period, if 
there are only small amounts for the settlement of 
creditors and the new structuring of reasons for 
denial, such as the application of § 290, sub-section 
1, no. 5 of the InsO during the entire proceedings. 
According to the theory, the aim of this model is the 
re-establishment of the functionality of courts, re-
ducing the burden on the budgets and amendments to 
the consumer insolvency proceedings with the 
remaining debt relief in order to satisfy the interests 
of both creditors and debtors (Goldenberg, 2006). 
 
 
3.3.6. The structure from the circle of creditors 
 
The author of this model is a representative of the 
collection bureau (Ger. Inkassowesen). According to 
him, a structure without opening the insolvency 
proceedings would be applied to consumer debtors 
with no bankruptcy estate. In the case when the 
debtor can cover the proceeding expenses, a sim-
plified insolvency proceeding would be available to 
him. If the debtor has no assets, then he files an 
insolvency request without attempting to reach an 
out-of-court agreement first, because costs would 
incur in that process. If the debtor’s request for 
deferring payments is denied, the court decides to 
temporarily postpone the insolvency proceedings 
due to the insufficiency of bankruptcy estate. This 
way the proceedings would be solved until the re-
maining debt relief. The model anticipates the ap-
pointment of a trustee in insolvency proceedings 
with no bankruptcy estate too. He would be respon-
sible for supervision, i.e. whether the debtor abides 
by his duties. If requests for denial are submitted 
during the temporarily postponed proceedings, the 
proceedings would have to continue, and if neces-
sary, following a decision on the denial would be de-
layed again. During the proceedings, on an annual 
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basis, the debtor would have to inform the trustee 
about the performance of his duties, e.g. in the case 
the debtor is unemployed, his duties would be to 
show his effort to obtain employment. The pro-
ceedings would be resumed only after the decision 
on the remaining debt relief. The general opinion of 
the theory is that the stated (Jäger’s) model primar-
ily satisfied the creditor’s interests, which is under-




3.3.7. The structure from the circle of 
insolvency administrators 
 
This is not a complete model of the transformation 
of the consumer insolvency proceedings and the 
remaining debt proceedings, but a model of indi-
vidual proposals of amendments. The aim of lawyer 
Plute, as an insolvency administrator with experi-
ence, was to offer suggestions that would avoid “...  
meaningless and burdensome working parts of the 
insolvency proceedings”. That could be ensured, e.g. 
by abolishing investigation and determination of 
claims in the current form and instead of that, a 
trustee or an insolvency administrator would con-
firm the balance which would then be deposited in 
court in a form of a list. This would lead to the 
abolition of the mandatory presentation of docu-
mentation to creditors before courts. Furthermore, 
the function § 178, sub-section 3 of the Insolvency 
Code would be avoided, and it would be exercised 
exclusively on a creditor’s request in the event of de-
nial of remaining debt relief. For the most part, the 





Although the primary goal of the comparative legal 
research was to analyze the German legal regula-
tion, it was equally important to identify economic 
elements of the structure of this institute, in order to 
demonstrate all the questions the legislator tried to 
answer during the constitution of a certain le-gal 
structure. That required an analysis of empha-sized 
issues related to the regulation of consumer 
bankruptcy, so that the legislator could opt for the 
solutions that would best respond to the reception 
request in the Croatian legal system. Therefore, it is 
necessary to harmonize solutions with the overall 
legislative corpus on one hand, and take into ac-
count the current socio-economic environment on 
the other hand. The German legislator has enabled a 
uniformed possibility for all insolvent consumers. 
After the determination of insolvency, every con-
sumer debtor has to make a sacrifice in the form of 
ceding his sizable assets to the creditors during the 
six-year period of good behavior. When the debt 
discharge is clear and predetermined, such as in 
German law, the path to reaching the discharge can 
be standardized with little deviation. Therefore, rea-
sonable standards have to be imposed, and the Ger-
man experience, with all its imperfections, provides 
an example of how such a process can be developed. 
Consequently, there is no doubt that the German 
model is a model of fairness. In terms of consisten-
cy, the German system seems to be the fairest from 
the perspective of consumers and legitimate source 
of social education. However, reforms are neces-sary 
because the mandatory debt repayment plans have 
caused problems for consumers who cannot achieve 
them. Thus, although the German legislator in the 
1980’s clearly indicated that debt discharge, 
modeled on the liberal American model, is not an 
option, the current state of insolvency of German 
consumers as well as the economically irrational le-
gal solutions indicate the need for change. The Draft 
on Act was an attempt to achieve the stated, with 
many ambiguities. De lege ferenda it is believed, 
that there is not the so-called “Pareto optimum”, i.e. 
a solution that would be ideal and acceptable for all 
participants in the consumer bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, the legal regulation of consumer 
bankruptcy in the legal system should rely on the 
continental legal tradition, provided that the indi-
vidual institutes are revised, without radical chang-es 
to the basic principles. 
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Prednosti i nedostatci njemačkog modela potrošačkog 






Pravno transplantiranje, kao pravna pojava, oduvijek je prisutno u pravnoj povijesti, a posebno je dobilo na 
izražaju u uvjetima stvaranja velikih ekonomskih integracija, kao što je EU. Članstvo Republike Hrvatska u 
Europskoj uniji ima svoje snažno pravno utemeljenje jer pripada kontinentalnoj školi prava zasnovanoj, pr-
votno, na recepciji rimskoga prava, a kasnije njemačkoga prava. Akademska javnost RH, uvjerenja je, kako 
harmonizacija stečajno- pravne regulative s regulativom zemalja EU-a nije sama sebi svrha, već ima snažno 
ekonomsko opravdanje. U tom kontekstu posebno se ukazuje na brojne nedorečenosti dosadašnje stečajne 
regulative, a jedna od njih je i nepostojanje lex specialis regulative za stečaj potrošača. Kako je zakonodavac 
pokazao inicijativu za recepcijom modela potrošačkog stečaja (Polazne osnove za uvođenje instituta Osob-
nog bankrota, Ministarstvo pravosuđa, Zagreb, 2012., str. 1.-6. te Nacrt Prijedloga iskaza o procjeni učinka 
propisa za pripremu Nacrta prijedloga Zakona o stečaju potrošača, Ministarstvo pravosuđa, Zagreb, 2012., 
str. 1-5. te konačno Nacrt prijedloga Zakona o stečaju potrošača, Ministarstvo pravosuđa, Zagreb, lipanj, 
2014.) po uzoru na njemačka pravna rješenja, autor u radu analizira opravdanost takvog uređenja.  
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